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Recent accounts by cognitive scientists of factors affecting cognition imply the need to reconsider
current dominant conceptual theories about science learning. These new accounts emphasize the
role of context, embodied practices, and narrative-based representation rather than learners’
cognitive constructs. In this paper we analyse data from a longitudinal study of primary school
children’s learning to outline a framework based on these contemporary accounts and to delineate
key points of difference from conceptual change perspectives. The findings suggest this framework
provides strong theoretical and practical insights into how children learn and the key role of
representational negotiation in this learning. We argue that the nature and process of conceptual
change can be re-interpreted in terms of the development of students’ representational resources.
Keywords: Conceptual change; Language; Learning; Qualitative research; 
Representations; Science education
Introduction
There is growing recognition that recent accounts by cognitive scientists of how
learners learn pose challenges for current understanding of conceptual learning in
science (Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Clark, 1997; Klein, 2006). Rather than viewing this
learning as primarily the refinement of mental constructs, these theorists assert the
“expressive” situated nature of cognition. They emphasize the fundamental role of
context, perception, identity, feelings, embodiment, metaphor, story-telling, and
pattern completion in learning. While these dimensions have always been of interest
*Corresponding author. Faculty of Education, Deakin University, Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds,
Geelong, VIC 3217, Australia. Email: tytler@deakin.edu.au
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in cognitive science, the traditional cognitive science agenda has tended to relegate
these to a support role. From this new perspective, conceptual knowledge is seen
more as implicit, perceptual, concrete, and variable across contexts, rather than as
propositional, abstract, and independent of context. This perspective foregrounds
the role of various kinds of representation (verbal, visual/spatial, embodied, and
mathematical) in supporting learning.
While these perspectives were receiving increasing attention we were conducting a
seven year longitudinal study of 15 children’s learning in science, starting with a
conceptual change perspective but increasingly drawing on this new literature to
make sense of data. There are a number of reported difficulties in conducting long-
term studies of this kind (Arzi, 1988; White & Arzi, 2005), including maintenance of
theoretical consistency over time. In this paper we attempt to turn this to advantage
in exploring the validity and usefulness of these new accounts of learning, drawing
on data from the longitudinal study of students’ engagement with the topic of
evaporation. Our research has also been guided by various perspectives, including
semiotic accounts of the representational nature of learning tasks in science (diSessa,
2004; Lemke, 2004), and socio-cultural theories of science learning as induction
into the meaning-making practices of science communities (Lemke, 2004). In this
paper we focus mainly on the implications of applying a learning framework based
on recent cognitive science perspectives to develop a more nuanced understanding
of individual students’ cognitive processes in learning, and consider how this frame-
work relates to current thinking in the conceptual change paradigm.
We first review these perspectives and their challenges to past and current accounts
of science learning as conceptual change, before considering some case study examples
of students’ representation of ideas about evaporation. We conclude by discussing the
extent to which a framework of emerging cognitive science accounts of learning
provides new and useful perspectives for making sense of the evidence from these
examples, and discuss the implications of the findings for teaching and learning science.
Recent Cognitive Science Accounts of Learning and Conceptual Change 
Theories
Over the last 20 years many assumptions about, and explanations of, cognition have
been questioned. Rather than viewing the brain as an orderly logical sorter of clearly
defined data sets, many cognitive scientists have argued for a model of the brain as a
highly flexible adaptor to multiple inputs, using many highly contextual provisional
perceptual cues to build understanding in an unplanned way. As noted by Klein
(2006, p. 151), cognitive scientists such as Barsalou (1999, 2003), Clark (1997),
and Lakoff and Johnson (1999), view thinking, especially by learners, as perceptual
processing and analogical mapping, where concepts and linguistic meanings are
“perceptually based, fuzzy and contextual.” Rather than use logical inferential
processes to understand and explain new phenomena or recognize familiar ideas,
learners focus on pattern completion based on perceptual recognition and simula-
tion. This implies that when students are constructing spatial representations of their
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understanding of a science topic, they are likely to be using perceptual mapping of
features of the phenomena, making “expressive” personal links with past experiences
and associated values, and embedding new understandings in a narrative of them-
selves as learners of this topic (Schwartz & Heiser, 2006). For Barsalou (2003),
concepts are better understood as skills applied to solving problems rather than as
stored and recalled knowledge. In pointing to the complex interplay between
students’ perceptual experience, beliefs, habitual and impromptu ideas, memories,
and representational resources, Baddeley and Logie (1999) and Logie (2003) claim
that perceptual processes constantly interact with past and emerging understandings
to guide student reasoning.
In reviewing recent accounts of cognition, Klein (2006) claimed that they form a
coherent set, and represent a shift from earlier perspectives. Following Lakoff and
Johnson (1999), he characterized this work as “second-generation” cognitive
science. Klein claimed that first-generation cognitive scientists viewed thinking as
primarily the logical manipulation of clearly defined symbols, where science explana-
tions are deduced from causal laws applied to particular conditions and events.
From this perspective, knowledge is understood as stored, stable mental constructs.
Language, or any other kind of representation, is understood as denoting proposi-
tional understandings, and therefore functions as a “by-product of thought” (Klein,
2006, p. 149). This view of cognition broadly aligns with early “classical” accounts
of conceptual change, as proposed by Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982).
From this viewpoint, students change their concepts through teacher-guided recog-
nition of the inadequacy of their prior, naive explanations, and shift commitment to
more logically compelling scientific accounts.
Klein’s labelling of “second-generation” perspectives is perhaps provocative in at
least two respects. First, while Klein (2006, p. 155) did not claim that second-gener-
ational perspectives simply replace mistaken earlier theories, his language implies
that earlier perspectives are in some way unitary and, as a set, outmoded. However,
many concerns taken up by more recent perspectives, such as informal reasoning
and pattern recognition, have been pursued by earlier cognitive scientists. Second, it
is difficult to definitively assign researchers to just one camp, given the complexity of
views they express. In particular, there has been considerable refinement within
conceptual change theory in recent decades (Vosniadou, 2008b). That being said,
Klein’s analysis opens the possibility of making sense of recent substantial shifts in
emphasis in how we view individual learning.
Conceptual change theorists have progressively refined the “classical” view drawn
from Kuhn’s (1970) theory of revolutionary paradigm shifts in science. In reviewing
the current state of conceptual change theory, Vosniadou (2008b) noted that there
was ongoing debate about the nature of what it is that changes, and extensive elabo-
ration of possible mechanisms that enable conceptual change processes. Despite a
strand of critique that argues for the fragmentary nature of an individual’s knowledge
and the complex nature of intuition in generating explanations of phenomena (diSessa,
Gillespie, & Esterley, 2004), and the contextually dependent nature of student
conceptions (Tytler, 1998a, 1998b; Tytler & Peterson, 2004), the presumption of a
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coherent mental structure remains the dominant paradigm for learner knowledge in
the conceptual change literature (diSessa et al., 2004). The structural entities which
comprise the theoretical explanatory elements for considering conceptual change are
variously held to be concepts or concepts within theories (Carey, 1985, 1999), theories
or mental models (Vosniadou, 1994), or ontologies (Chi, Slotta, & De Leeuw, 1994).
Debate has focused on whether concepts are more accurately described as fragmentary
understandings rather than resolved ideas, and on the nature of the concepts and
conceptions themselves (diSessa & Sherin, 1998). Debate has also focused on whether
conceptual change can be considered a homogeneous phenomenon across different
domains (e.g. Carey, 1986).
The many mechanisms explored for supporting conceptual change include mental
models and model-based reasoning (Clement, 2000; Gilbert & Boulter, 2000; Harri-
son & Treagust, 2000; Justi & Gilbert, 2003), reasoning through analogies (Harrison
& Treagust, 1993), and cognitive conflict. Advocates of model-based reasoning have
claimed that the process of constructing, critiquing, and revising external modelling
representations can promote conceptual change. However, the question of how this
approach might be understood and justified, especially in the context of recent
cognitive science accounts of student reasoning and knowledge, needs to be further
explored and theorized. Smith, diSessa, and Roschelle (1993) and Vosniadou
(2008b) have critiqued the traditional cognitive conflict approach because it seeks to
eradicate student ideas that are more usefully seen as conceptual supports for new
knowledge. However, conceptual change theory has struggled to develop a generally
accepted view of how shifts occur, or provide strong evidence that these methods
lead to substantial learning gains.
Researchers within a conceptual change orientation have also focused on affective
and motivational factors that enhance conceptual change processes (Sinatra, 2005).
Treagust and Duit (2008), in their review of contemporary conceptual change
research, offer an example of “affective conceptual changes” in which motivation is
shown to flow from students’ confidence in using analogies. From this perspective,
affective elements are recognized but are seen as support for conceptual advance-
ment. By contrast, Jakobson and Wickman (2008), in analyzing interactions in an
elementary school science classroom, show how conceptual learning is inextricably
linked with aesthetic judgement in the way teachers and students approach tasks.
There is increasing recognition within conceptual change research of the contextual
and socio-cultural factors influencing learning. This recognition underpinned early
conceptual change schemes (e.g. Cosgrove & Osborne, 1985; Driver & Oldham,
1986) incorporating student questions and open classroom discussion. A growing
body of research into classroom practice, sitting broadly within the conceptual
change framework, focuses on discourse and the teacher’s role in managing class-
room talk (e.g. Mortimer & Scott, 2003). There have been calls for more research
into classroom talk in supporting conceptual change (Mercer, 2008).
A number of researchers have attempted to integrate conceptual change and
socio-cultural views. For instance, Vosniadou (2008b) noted that “conceptual
change should not be seen as only an individual, internal cognitive process, but as a
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social activity that takes place in a complex socio-cultural world.” In explaining how
her conceptual change perspective differed from cultural studies views, Vosniadou
(2008a) claimed that mental models and model-based reasoning were crucial to
explaining the creation of artefacts and the capacity of humans to develop and
modify theories about the natural world. In this way, “a globe as a cultural artefact is
nothing more than a reified mental model of the earth viewed from a certain
perspective” (Vosniadou, 2008a, p. 281). However, despite increasing acknowledge-
ment of the possible role of representations in facilitating learning (e.g. Vosniadou,
2008b), conceptual change researchers continue to give primacy to mental models
as the key driver of learning.
One criticism of the adequacy of these recent cognitive science ideas to inform
practice is captured by the distinctions Reif and Larkin (1991) made between
scientific and everyday thinking processes. Reif and Larkin (1991, p. 745) argued
that the everyday processes, because of their reliance on contextual, informal,
associative reasoning, and rich local knowledge, were inadequate for learning
science. Students are expected to acquire skills in sustained inferential reasoning and
abstract manipulation of formal symbols, and to understand what counts as
“adequate specifications of how concepts are connected to their referents.” From
this perspective, it might seem as though contemporary cognitive scientists have
simply identified, or given new prominence to, the “naïve” cognitive processes
learners use in their everyday world. However, Reif and Larkin (1991) also noted
that learning in science is achieved by both formal and non-formal methods. By
formal methods they referred to the use of symbolic representations such as
formulas, algebra, and vector analysis guided by rule-based reasoning. By non-
formal methods they referred to approaches that “exploit human perceptual
processes and qualitative reasoning capabilities” (p. 749). They noted that effective
learning in science required students to use both methods in “complementary ways”
(p. 750), where non-formal methods can be “appropriately refined to ensure their
consistency with more formal science knowledge.” However, their account did not
explain how this complementarity might be achieved in practice.
A Learning Framework Based on Recent Cognitive Science Perspectives
From the literature reviewed thus far, and particularly drawing on Klein’s (2006)
analysis, the key claims to inform such a learning framework, that would delineate it
from traditional cognitive science perspectives and from classical conceptual change
ideas, are: 
(1) the partial, context-dependent and individual ways in which meaning is
constructed;
(2) the perceptually based, contingent, “expressive” nature of individuals’ under-
standing of concepts, as distinct from them being well defined and invariant;
(3) the importance of non-formal processes such as associative thinking and pattern
completion, alongside formal reasoning; and
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(4) the critical role of representations as cultural artefacts in supporting reasoning
and conceptual change as illustrative of the way language constitutes and shapes
thought rather than acts as an after-the-event by-product of conceptual under-
standing.
In this study we focus particularly on those elements of recent cognitive science
thinking that deal with the nature of reasoning and meaning-making and the role
played by representations in thinking about science conceptions. The key elements
in Klein’s distinctions that underpin the learning framework we take to be: (1) the
distinction between the formally expressed nature of science concepts as opposed to
individual understanding of these concepts, and (2) the critical importance of the
multiple representations of science, in constituting science ideas.
We are not arguing against a conceptual focus, but rather that emphasizing formal
conceptual structures leads us away from the more nuanced view of learning we
need to adopt. If we can argue this case effectively, part of the outcome will be the
need for research into the relationship between science concepts, formally
conceived, and more informal, perceptual and representational elements that under-
pin learning and reasoning and meaning-making.
Aims of the Study and Research Methods
This paper draws on data from a longitudinal study across the primary school
years to explore the plausibility and explanatory value of the cognitive science
ideas represented by the learning framework. The study began by aiming to track
conceptual change pathways of 15 children, but it became necessary to adopt a
more complex perspective on learning in order to make sense of the data. Some of
these data and analysis have been published previously, but here we revisit these
and more recent data to test the usefulness of the learning framework. The
research questions are: 
● To what extent does this framework, drawing on recent cognitive science views of
learning, provide generative insights into the processes of student learning in
primary science?
● What are the implications of these views for understanding the nature of concepts
and conceptual progression in learning in science?
● What are the implications of these views for supporting learners to construct
meaning in science classrooms?
Research Design
The study involved a longitudinal design in which 15 (reducing to nine children in
the final year) Australian children’s science ideas were tracked across seven years of
primary school. This study used a qualitative methodology (Denzin & Lincoln,
1995) in which data from interviews, collection of work samples, and classroom
observations were used to analyze their developing understandings of key science
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concepts. The interviews were semi-structured and focused on children’s responses
to diverse phenomena and their exploration of these.
Work relating to the first three years of the study, on evaporation, has been
previously published, with analysis grounded in conceptual change perspectives but
containing analyses that explored the influence of personal factors of young children
in framing their explanations, the role of phenomenal and personal context in
students’ responses, the importance of associative thinking in developing explana-
tions, and the personal ways in which individuals invest meaning in adopting
conceptual positions. Some of this work will be re-interpreted in this paper.
In the study’s final two years, we focused particularly on children’s responses to a
classroom sequence on evaporation. When the children were in Grade 5 (age 10) the
researchers conducted a whole class orientation activity lesson in which children
watched a frying pan of water boil, drawing and annotating to describe the progress
of bubbles. A discussion on what was happening ensued. Following this, one of the
researchers presented the class with a model consisting of plastic beads in a perspex
tray, as the basis for discussing evaporation involving molecules of water breaking
free of the surface and going into the air. A drawing was then constructed, during
class discussion, which depicted water boiling in terms of molecules of water chang-
ing to a gas (spread out molecules) in the bubbles. The molecular model was
presented as a scientific idea the children might find useful in thinking about these
phenomena, and the language used was relatively open so children would not feel
they were receiving “one true perspective.” Following this discussion children
worked in groups on three successive activities representing different evaporative
contexts, for which they were encouraged to use the idea of molecules in their expla-
nations. The activities involved condensation, the evaporation of a wet handprint
from a chalkboard, and the distribution of eucalyptus oil scent around a room.
Over the following two weeks, the classroom teachers ran evaporation activities
using notes and worksheets. There was no observation of these lessons but all were
undertaken. The lessons involved the level of water in a jug over a week, the
evaporation of a puddle and a drawing of what would be seen through a powerful
microscope, and an investigation of drying cloth under different conditions. While
the activities challenged children to use diagrammatic representations to depict what
was happening, teachers were asked not to explicitly teach the molecular model or
resolve student explanations around one idea. Following this sequence, nine
children, who are part of the longitudinal study (Tytler & Peterson, 2005), were
interviewed individually concerning their interpretation of the sequence based on
their written responses to the worksheets, and their views were probed concerning
the evaporation of a drop of alcohol placed on a glass slide. They were asked to
draw, as if through a powerful microscope, what was happening to the alcohol drop
on the slide, and also to represent in a drawing “where is the alcohol now?” A similar
interview was conducted a year later, without any intervening activity. This interview
included discussion of condensation in a terrarium. The interviews were transcribed
and analyzed to explore the way in which different children negotiated representa-
tional meaning to advance their understandings of the topic, and the children’s
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drawings collected and interpreted, to construct the two case studies described
below.
The focus of these interviews was to explore the children’s ideas, and to stimulate
and challenge their representations of evaporative phenomena. The intention was to
explore their capacity to respond to scientific representational criteria such as preci-
sion, completeness, and coherence across modes. At upper primary school level,
children are starting to be inducted into formal representation of science ideas, even
though many teachers lack confidence to coordinate these in constructing coherent
accounts of phenomena. It was our intention to explore how this representational
focus might provide insight into children’s ideas and explanatory resources, and
support learning.
Results
Analysis of longitudinal study data concerning understandings of evaporation,
drawn from interviews and written responses of 15 children over their first four years
of schooling, has been reported previously (Tytler & Peterson, 2004). The earlier
analysis challenged previous claims (Bar & Galili, 1994; Osborne & Cosgrove, 1983;
Russell, Harlen, & Watt, 1989) that children’s evaporative ideas follow a relatively
orderly, age-related progression through the sequence of conceptions: Water dries
up— it just happens like that; water is absorbed into surfaces; water goes upwards to follow
a water cycle; water goes into the air; water changes form and goes into the air.
In the analysis of conceptual positions in the study a class of explanations was
labelled “associative,” consisting of analogical or metaphorical references such as
water dissolving into clothes. It was hard to know how to sit this along a conceptual
scale. In a previous but related study (Tytler, 2000), almost half of Year 1 and Year
6 students’ explanations of condensation phenomena, and more than 25% of evapo-
ration explanations, were associative, perhaps linking “moisture” with “coldness,” or
referring to personal anecdotes such as about humid swimming pool changing
rooms. From a classical conceptual progression perspective these are problematic
data, but they nicely exemplify the first three elements of the learning framework,
namely the individual, contextual and perceptual nature of meaning-making, and
the importance of associative thinking.
We also argued, on the basis of contrasting the developing explanations of two
children, Calum and Anna, that even when children are using ostensibly the “same”
conception, it is approached and expressed very differently, drawing on perceptual
analogies and personal narratives with a highly individual flavour, and on different
aspects of the phenomena (Tytler & Peterson, 2004). Calum in Grade 2 seemed to
make a significant advance in his conceptualization of evaporation when he
explained a wet handprint evaporating in a room by linking it with a beach outdoors: 
Calum: If it was on a beach and say it was high tide … let’s just say the sand wasn’t
there maybe concrete … and it’s high tide and when the tide goes out if there
be wet patches like that it would evaporate and go back into the air and
there’s a cycle of rain. It rains and then.
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Anna’s Grade 2 accounts involve verbal descriptions of water coming “through the
air in tiny droplets” but unlike Calum she is unable to weave this idea into a coher-
ent explanatory narrative using personal associations or other representations. We
might see this distinction as exemplifying Bruner’s (1985) “narrative cognition,”
where an understanding consists not only of knowledge of the logical structure of
concepts but the capacity to weave them into a personally meaningful story. One
might see Calum’s explanation as a case of the analogic thinking highlighted in
conceptual change literature. However, that literature is largely concerned with
formal relations between analogies introduced by a teacher, and the target concept,
whereas Calum’s explanation is personally generated and has the characteristics of
perceptual and associative thinking. The value of this form of reasoning is indicated
by the fact that Calum between Grades 2 and 3 underwent a major “restructuring”
of his ideas about evaporative phenomena.
We would argue that the account of cognitive science views represented in the
learning framework, on the personal nature of meaning, the associative nature of
thinking, and the expressive nature of concepts, provides powerful ways to interpret
these earlier findings. This current paper is concerned to explore in more detail the
usefulness of these ideas for achieving a sharper sense of children’s growing explana-
tory competence. In particular we intend to further explore the role of verbal and
visual language, as representation, in providing an adequate account of these chil-
dren’s learning and to develop a clearer sense of how children’s conceptual learning
might best be supported. What follows are data from interviews with two children of
the nine who remained in the study until their final year of primary school, selected
to represent a variety of ideas and approaches.
Rosalie
In Grade 1 (age six), Rosalie’s explanation of the condensation in a terrarium is
strongly perceptual and associative: 
Rosalie: Well, um, I think because it got all hot, um, well some of it just melts. It just
melts … the pot, it got really, like we get really sweaty, it’s like we get like
that.
In the preparatory grade and Grade 1 her accounts of evaporation consist of
simple statements without explanatory content. In Grade 2 she settles on a minimal-
ist narrative account provided by a water cycle image that had been presented in
class by her teacher. This becomes the basis of her explanation for the next few
years:
Grade 2 Disappearing Handprint
I: It’ll dry? What’ll happen to it, why will it do that?
Rosalie: Um … because the sun sometimes the sun, like what happens is little bits of
water, I don’t know how, but it comes up in the air and you can’t even see it,
and it comes back down again, when it rains.
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In Grade 5, after the presentation of a molecular model in conjunction with a
number of evaporation phenomena, she described the evaporation of a puddle seen
through a microscope in terms of particles (see Figure 1). This explanation now has
a narrative of “molaques” forming together with others to make clouds, but the
drawing and the verbal description are not well coordinated: 
Rosalie: You would most likely see tiny molaques floating up in the air. While it is in
the air it forms with other molaques & makes clouds.
Figure 1. Rosalie’s representation of a puddle evaporatingIn the subsequent interview she again draws on and elaborates this water cycle repre-
sentation in describing a wet handprint disappearing, adding a perceptual associa-
tion of overfull clouds not being able to hold on, to cause rain:
Grade 5 Disappearing Handprint
Rosalie: Um, it evaporates … all the … which means that it’s um, it’s left and it’s
gone into little particles … and it’s um, floated up into the air … and it’s
met with other particles of water and it makes clouds and when there’s um,
when there’s so, so much that it can’t hold on, it just … that’s what causes
rain.
In that interview, she is challenged by the interviewer to explain what happens to an
alcohol drop as it evaporates off a slide. Her commitment to a water cycle narrative
causes her problems with evaporation in the room. There is no sense of distribution
in her narrative of the drop’s pathway outside into the air. Rather, she draws on a
Figure 1. Rosalie’s representation of a puddle evaporating
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range of different ideas in response to the questions, for instance attributing inten-
tionality to the drop (or smell—this is unclear) which is “strong” and will “eventu-
ally find out how to.”
Grade 5 Alcohol Drops
I: Now, just explain to me how we smell the alcohol. How come you can smell
it?
Rosalie: Well, ‘cause it’s really strong, um, maybe ‘cause it’s rising … And like I said
with the other thing with the air (rising).
I: Ok, so … what’s happened to the drop now?
Rosalie: Um, it’s probably gone into the … um … I don’t know how it’d get outside,
but probably through like windows or … I don’t know.
I: You think it’s gone outside or do you think it might be around here?
Rosalie: It’s probably around here or … yeah, and then it’s going to eventually find
how to get out into the air.
Rosalie is asked to draw what you would see looking through a powerful microscope
(see Figure 2). The inflexibility of her water cycle representation is apparent in her
drawing, which is an uncoordinated mix of molecular ideas and classical water cycle
imagery. She comments as she draws: 
Rosalie: I was planning to like … they’re the little bits that are still on there, ‘cause I
can kind of see it. And that’s all the little molecules and then they all go up
and kind of.
I: Right, so they’re actually going up, aren’t they? (Rosalie inserts arrows in the
drawing to show this.)
Figure 2. Rosalie’s drawing of an alcohol drop evaporating
Figure 2. Rosalie’s drawing of an alcohol drop evaporating
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Rosalie draws a set of joined dots on the slide, perhaps to represent the residue
apparent there (“I can kind of see it”).
In Grade 6, there are echoes of the same views. In this case though, she is much
more confident representing molecules distributed in the air rather than making
their way to clouds in an over-determined manner. She mixes this with a visual
representation of “wafting” (see Figure 3). It is not clear how she sees the relation
between the molecules and air, with the conversation around the drawing showing
that she views smell as separate from substance.
Figure 3. Rosalie’s drawing of an alcohol drop in Grade 6
Grade 6 Alcohol Drops
I: Could you draw where it would be and how it would be in the room?
Rosalie: Well it could get, like it evaporates, but it could like go into the glass, if you
know what I mean, it could be like a spread of molecules.
I: And tell me if you can draw how come you can smell?
Rosalie: Because the alcohol has like an ingredient that makes the liquid, so you put it
on there and the little particles that come up, its like the smell comes from
there.
I: So could you draw that? OK, so it is wafting, but you have also drawn little
particles in the air?
Rosalie: Yes, molecules.
In her verbal explanation of condensation on the terrarium, she again draws heavily
on embodied associations of “closeness” and the “trapped” nature of the situation to
explain observed details, a common occurrence for these children. She also refers to
“dew,” a perceptual association, and air “sucked in.” She seems to be searching for
perceptual hooks to build her account around. Her drawing of the terrarium deals
only with representations of movement of water and visible moisture.
Figure 3. Rosalie’s drawing of an alcohol drop in Grade 6
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Commentary on Rosalie.   Rosalie returns to various explanatory themes over the
years. From early on, once she starts talking about the water going up into the
sky (earlier again she talked of soaking in, and going up to the sun), she has a
strong water cycle representation. In Grade 2 she is told by her teacher about
little invisible pieces of water floating up, and she adopts this to frame her
explanatory narrative on several occasions over the next year. The interviews
demonstrate her increasing verbal confidence with this idea, but her lack of
capacity to coordinate this water cycle story with a spatial representation in her
drawings. Figure 2 shows very clearly that her understanding is partial. This
drawing could in some sense be interpreted as an example of the construction of
a synthetic mental model, a term used in the conceptual change literature to
describe “students’ attempts to synthesize two incompatible pieces of informa-
tion—one coming from the scientific concepts presented through information
and the other coming from students’ prior knowledge” (Vosniadou, 2008b).
This notion of synthetic models is used by a number of conceptual change theo-
rists (Chi, 2008; Wiser & Smith, 2008) to describe the development of miscon-
ceptions as mental models which arise from the inability of students to
coordinate naïve and scientific ideas. They tend to be characterized as occupy-
ing predictable and stable positions within a conceptual trajectory towards the
full expert conception (see Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti (2008) who
seem to contrast these models with more fleeting “internally inconsistent
responses”).
However, while Rosalie’s responses do seem to represent an attempt to coordi-
nate some sense of a water cycle representation with the newly introduced particle
idea, we would argue they are more varied, more perceptually cued, and individual
than can be characterized as a “model.” They are clearly and profoundly situated
within the demands of the interview task and questions. The multiple and fragmen-
tary resources she juggles and brings to bear on the task are embedded in the tran-
script trail as she responds to the interviewer’s challenges to construct a coherent
explanation. Views within the conceptual change are however changing, and in
more recent writing Vosniadou (2008a, p. 279) describes synthetic models as “not
stable, alternative theories, but dynamic, situated, and constantly changing repre-
sentations that adapt to contextual variables and/or to the learners’ developing
knowledge.” Nevertheless, the word “model” carries with it a history that conjures
up resolved conceptual positions, and the term is used in different, often ambigu-
ous ways in the conceptual change literature. Based on this transcript trail, we
would argue it is more reasonable to consider Figure 2 with its associated talk as
representing an unsuccessful attempt to coordinate the different representations
that are required to construct a coherent account of the evaporating alcohol.
Figures 2 and 3 are clearly demonstrating the representational nature of the chal-
lenges Rosalie faces, and her conceptual growth is the story of her growing success
in bringing alignment to these partial representations. Thus, in Figure 3, even
without intervening teaching activities, she draws on a particle distribution repre-
sentation that sits only slightly uncomfortably with the notion of wafting, and for
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the first time coordinates this with a verbal account of the smell permeating the
room. Again, in Figure 3, under the pressure of the task, she is generating these
two representations to respond to different aspects of the evaporation and smell, in
a manner that is tentative and contextualized within the interview questions. We
would argue that, in keeping with the fourth principle of the learning framework,
Rosalie’s conceptual growth consists of growing command of these representational
resources that are needed to think about distribution and movement of molecules,
and that the particular coordinated narratives she constructs with these are
profoundly contingent on the context in which she is asked to explain. In this
process, the term “mental model” even if understood as dynamic and situated,
seems an over-interpretation of what Rosalie is doing. Rather, Rosalie demonstrates
a growing command of these representational resources as ways of talking and
thinking about evaporation. The act of generating and coordinating these represen-
tations is, we would argue, coincident with reasoning about the evaporation
phenomena.
In her verbal explanations Rosalie uses embodied metaphors of being trapped,
and sweaty, to describe the formation of “dew” on the terrarium and leaf surfaces. In
the interviews she responds tentatively, fishing for representational hooks on which
to hang her explanations. We might look at her explanations in terms of perceptual
cuing and associative reasoning that opens up representational options. While she
has words to represent aspects of the evaporation process, however, she has not
solved the task of representing the phenomenon in a coherent way across modes.
Notwithstanding her confusion, the conversations seem to be moving her forward,
particularly in Grade 6 when she draws in particles distributed in the air. In those
Grade 5 and 6 interviews, the focus on representations is productive in challenging
and supporting her to align and refine her representations.
We might take a conceptual change view of Rosalie’s trajectory and claim that she
is shifting from one established perspective to another (from a water cycle, to an
“absorbed in air,” and finally to the beginnings of a particle perspective). However,
this does not seem to capture the associative/metaphorical moves she makes to
explain new phenomena or remember her previous explanations. Rosalie’s trajectory
involves gradually opening up new perspectives through searching for associations
that might help, and developing and coordinating representations of different
aspects of evaporative phenomena such as the movement and distribution of
material, and the relationship of particles to the substances involved.
Jeremy
Jeremy is very attracted to visual/spatial representations in his approach to
phenomena, often noticing visual patterns or fine detail. He has a talent for draw-
ing. In his Prep year (age five) he explained a puddle evaporating (see Figure 4)
with a drawing showing the gathering of his classmates around the puddle. For all
these young children, the social context was apparent in their descriptions of their
learning.
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Figure 4. Jeremy’s prep drawing of a puddle evaporating
Prep, Puddle Drying
Jeremy: When we left the puddle might have disappeared. It went into the sun.
In Grade 1 he had a different idea, pulling together two major ideas of cause (the
sun) and movement (draining) that reappeared over the years:
Grade 1 Puddle
Jeremy: The sun probably shone on it, pointing to it and it drained off into the
ground.
Jeremy’s view of the nature of smell went through an interesting development. In
Grade 3, discussing a bottle of eucalyptus oil, he was clear that over time, the fumes
would all escape leaving behind a liquid that did not smell.
Grade 3 Eucalyptus Bottle
I: How come you can smell it?
Jeremy: Maybe because there are fumes trying to escape? It might also be a gas.
In Grade 5, he adapts a molecular representation to expand on this idea, in explain-
ing a class activity where people put up their hand when they first smell eucalyptus
from a bottle opened at the front of the class.
Figure 4. Jeremy’s prep drawing of a puddle evaporating
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Grade 5 Eucalyptus Bottle
Jeremy: I think um, yeah, … the lines (?) going in a zigzag and the um, smell er, like,
had a ride on a molecule and … (?)… so that like, these people smelled it and
then … (?)
I: So the smell’s on a molecule of what?
Jeremy: Um, a molecule of like, of er, moisture … actually ’cause the eucalyptus oil
was moisture and the smell gathered on the moisture in the air and then it
went around everywhere, wafting around.
Jeremy had drawn the smell as passengers on small cars to represent molecules, in
his class drawing (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Jeremy’s representation of the relationship between smell and eucalyptus moleculesThis sequence illustrates a conceptual difficulty well established in the concep-
tual change literature, concerning coordination of the phenomenon of smell with
the idea of substance. Children tend to think of smell as a separate material, and
the shift to a material view involving sensory stimulation through contact with the
vapour is an example of a major strand of conceptual change theory; that many
major conceptual changes involve ontological shifts whereby a concept (smell) is
assigned a different position in an ontological map (from substance to process) that
is presumed to characterize an individuals’ mental state. Jeremy’s case illustrates
how this should be seen as essentially a representational issue involving characteriz-
ing the mechanism through which smell is imagined to relate to alcohol molecules.
In representing how the smell might be thought of, Jeremy is clarifying for himself,
and the interviewer, his reasoning, and this opens up a chance to challenge and
negotiate his ideas.
When asked what he had learnt from the classroom sequence, he offers a percep-
tually detailed account of molecular distribution and behaviour: 
Figure 5. Jeremy’s representation of the relationship between smell and eucalyptus molecules
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Jeremy: Well, I didn’t … I didn’t know all this molecule business, I thought they were
just … I used to think it was actually just waves of like, um, lots of molecules
gathered up, but then I was … now I’m thinking like, you couldn’t really see.
I didn’t know they were just … just like little microscopic molecules whizzing
here and everywhere at like, breakneck speed.
Grades 5 and 6 Alcohol Evaporation.   When he discusses the drop of alcohol in the
Grade 5 interview, Jeremy becomes very interested in the shape as it spreads. He
describes it as a combination of drying and evaporating. He draws the drop seen
through a microscope, representing molecular distribution very adequately both in
terms of the mechanism of evaporation, and the distribution in the room. In Grade 6
he imposes a strong water cycle narrative on his discussion of where the alcohol
goes, including a cloud in his drawing of molecules.
Commentary on Jeremy.   Jeremy is a very visually oriented student who looks intently
at the shape of things and the visual aspects of change. He seems capable of offering
coherent representational accounts, for instance in his verbal and diagrammatic
accounts of the relation of smell and material evaporation, being consistent with that
over a few years. His visual representation of evaporation changes from Grade 5 to 6,
seemingly dependent on cues given in the interview. In each case he coordinates his
talk with his diagrammatic representation, and in each case weaves a coherent narra-
tive around the movement of molecules, in Grade 6 focusing not on the distribution
but on the relation of evaporation to condensation and the water cycle. Thus he
coordinates his representations to provide varied accounts of different aspects of
evaporative phenomena. As with Rosalie, we can see in Jeremy’s case the highly
personal and associative nature of meaning-making, and the fundamental role
played by representation in framing the learning pathway.
The other insight offered by this case is the essentially representational nature of
the ontological problem of coordinating the idea of smell with material distribution.
Jeremy’s characterization made apparent his ideas, and opened up the possibility of
negotiation. This characterization is useful in moving us away from a casting of the
problem in terms of category change within large scale and stable mental structures
(Chi et al., 1994) to a representational issue that in principle suggests a mechanism
for supporting change through the introduction, refinement, and recasting of
representations bearing on this difficulty. We would argue that the conceptual change
literature on ontological change provides valuable insights into the conceptual
difficulties attached to learning some science concepts, but that these are structural
issues. At the level of individual learning, an explicit focus on representation provides
a possible productive way forward.
Findings: Emerging themes
This paper first described findings drawn from an earlier analysis of the “concep-
tions” used by the 15 children over time, to show that they do not represent stable
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configurations, but are better thought of as ideas children have access to in order to
explain a variety of evaporative phenomena. They are “ways of talking” that are
sometimes used in conjunction with each other to construct explanations. The earlier
analysis also showed the very individual nature of children’s explanations of phenom-
ena, even when they might formally be said to have the same “conception.” This
finding challenges the notion that a conception can be easily identified and described,
and raises the possibility that learning pathways in science are very individual and
complex. The findings, as a set, broadly support the learning framework based on
Klein’s analysis, in relation to the personal nature of meaning and understanding, the
fundamentally perceptual and expressive nature of concepts, and the importance of
associative thinking alongside more formal logics. The two case studies described
above are an attempt to further unpack the individuality in children’s approaches to
understanding, and to explore the different resources that children use to deal with a
challenge to construct more coherent, canonical representations of the evaporative
process. They are also intended to explore how we might productively think of chil-
dren’s developing competence and understanding. We present the findings of the
study as several emerging themes in relation to the research questions. 
(1) The insights provided by the learning framework based on recent developments in cogni-
tive science, into the process of student learning in science.
Traditional conceptual change theory suggests these children are moving through a
series of resolved conceptions that are mental states (models, concepts, or ontologi-
cal structures). More recent, nuanced accounts might suggest that they are working
with “an opening up of the conceptual space … creating the possibility of entertain-
ing different perspectives and different points of view,” and drawing on “stored
knowledge” to guide new understanding (Vosniadou, 2008a, p. 279). We would
claim, however, that this cognitive work at heart involves interpreting, constructing,
and refining representations of this emerging conceptual understanding, rather than
simply negotiating changes in stored conceptual space. The four principles of the
learning framework suggest that the learning process works on a number of levels
and is more complex than described by standard conceptual accounts. Klein’s view
has provided a useful way for us to interpret these case studies. First, the very
individual way children approach learning and express their understanding is
apparent, supporting the earlier findings of Tytler and Peterson (2004). Jeremy’s
highly visual interpretations of the puddle, or of the smell riding on molecules, are
examples of children’s individual ways of expressing ideas. Their stories and
metaphorical associations, and the way they weave their representations into an
explanatory narrative, are very different from one another in ways beyond simple
variations around otherwise resolved conceptual models. These differences concern
the ways these children make meaning.
Second, there are numerous examples in these data of children making sense of
phenomena by drawing on perceptual links. These include the trapped, humid, or
moist terrarium and Calum’s beach, Jeremy’s search for visual cues in constructing
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his explanations, and Rosalie’s attempts to pull together practised water cycle
images, perceptual cues from the alcohol residue on the slide, wafting images and
eventually particle distribution ideas, to construct explanations of evaporation.
Third, children’s thinking, suggested by these case studies, is centrally character-
ized by analogical reasoning, metaphorical linking, and recognition of perceptual or
contextual similarity with other phenomena. Even when Jeremy is applying logic to
develop coherent narratives around spatial representations, his explanations are shot
through with perceptual and associative thinking. Just as this is true as they first
learn about evaporative phenomena, it also applies to the application of the idea to
new contexts.
Fourth, our focus on representation in relation to thinking about evaporation is
consistent with recent cognitive science’s views on the role of language, or
languages, in constituting and shaping thought. Children were able to advance their
understanding of evaporative processes through foregrounding and negotiating
representations of molecular distribution. This was part of Rosalie’s movement over
the two interviews and Jeremy’s coordination of the relation of smell to substance.
We argue that these non-formal aspects of learning processes are central in
science. They are core resources for reasoning, in the same way that students’
construction and interpretations of their own and others’ representations can be
understood as critical reasoning tools. This perspective does not downplay the
crucial role of a conceptual focus on science learning, and the need for teachers to be
clear about the concepts they wish students to learn. However, the means by which
these concepts can be imagined, known, modified, and applied to actions in the
world, and the claims scientists make with these concepts, need to be understood
fundamentally as representational work. The learning framework provides a useful,
nuanced way to understand the resources learners use and the challenges they face
in being meaning-makers in this domain.
(2) The need to re-think the nature of concepts and of conceptual progression, in character-
izing knowledge and learning in science.
Results from the earlier analyses (Tytler & Peterson, 2004) indicate that at least for
this set of evaporative conceptions there is not a clear conceptual pathway that
students follow, but nevertheless a gradually increasing access to the “air” concep-
tion, supporting diSessa’s (1993, 2008) account of conceptual understanding as
fragmentary. The case studies show a growing sophistication and some coherence
in their views. In particular, we can see the shift from simplistic water cycle views
to representations of water and alcohol in air, and the gradual shift from a global
(involving clouds) to a local view of evaporation. However, each child develops
individual approaches to what he or she focuses on, and generates different under-
standings. Particle representations of evaporation have a number of different
dimensions. Where these children have achieved a competence in explaining evap-
oration and molecular distribution, they nonetheless have a range of views on the
relation of substance to smell, the relation of molecules to the substance, and to air
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when it is a vapour, and on the ongoing existence of substance across forms. The
study showed that each student relied on everyday ontological beliefs to make
sense of these relationships. Explaining evaporative phenomena involves offending
a number of these everyday ontological beliefs, which became apparent in these
case studies as distinct representational challenges. The relation between smell,
alcohol molecules, and water was different for each child, and developing under-
standings took complex and individual pathways. The challenge to refine, clarify,
and justify their representations of these relationships provided generative learning
experiences.
A full account of evaporation involves knowing how to construct and interpret
representations across a range of these relations. The case studies show it is possible
to provide a good account of particular evaporative phenomena using partial
resources. Explanations and representations will always be selective and partial,
because there is always something more to be represented about causes and material
distribution (in this case) and categories that can be explicated through diverse
metaphors (the water sucked into the air, the terrarium explained as a mini world,
and the imagery of closeness [hot, moist] of the terrarium). diSessa et al. (2004)
argue that the “fragmented” view of knowledge (as opposed to the view that individ-
uals’ mental structures are coherent) “suggests extended collection and organization
of elements along the path to expertise, and it has much more room for individual
variation” (p. 846). This aligns with evidence in this study.
A conception can be understood as a mix of representational accounts of phenom-
ena. Children, in constructing explanations, are not simply re-running a transcen-
dent understanding in a new context, but learning to coordinate perceptual
associations and representational resources, to re-represent these and link them to
the phenomenon (Tytler, Prain, & Peterson, 2007). Knowledge is continually emer-
gent, and understanding fundamentally “in process.” Children’s thinking is situated
at quite a fundamental level within the task or the interview, and there is growing
consensus (e.g. Vosniadou, 2008a) that this is true also for expert adults. Rather than
an orderly progression of ideas, student learning entails gradually bringing into a
more coherent relation an array of informal thoughts and analogies and anecdotes
related to phenomena, in a process of representational weaving. The learning task of
coming to coordinate and use accepted scientific conceptions involves learning to
coordinate appropriate representations such that they are coherent, complete and
clear, in order to construct convincing explanatory narratives.
(3) Supporting learners to construct meaning.
Teachers need to conceptualize learning in science partly in terms of students’
induction into the representational conventions and practices of science, and their
capacity to coordinate these. Teachers need to provide a representation-rich envi-
ronment, with opportunities for students to negotiate, integrate, refine, and translate
ideas across representations. They need to make explicit to students the role of
representation in learning science. The real focus on teaching, in introducing and
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establishing scientific accounts of the world, is the underlying representations that
are woven into narrative accounts of phenomena, and the ways in which these are
coordinated. The evidence in this paper would indicate this representational weav-
ing is a highly contextual and individual process, and the pedagogy needs to be
correspondingly responsive to and supportive of individual meaning-making. This
view of teaching and learning offers a more nuanced and active view of knowledge
construction than the traditional focus on resolved, declarative modes of knowing.
As such, a representational focus could provide support for teachers to develop a
more engaging sense of science ideas, that could better capture scientific ways of
thinking.
Conclusions and Implications for Classroom Practice
We argue that recent perspectives of cognitive science, represented in the learning
framework, provide strong explanatory accounts of the learning in these case studies,
and indicate the need to re-think the nature of concepts, and the nature of progress
in learning science. We assert that a focus on representational negotiation should be
a significant process in science classrooms, with the teacher opening up discussion of
representations and developing an explicit language for discussing them.
For this to happen, concepts need to be understood as ways of thinking that provide
the means of explaining a variety of phenomena. There should be greater emphasis
on inducting students into powerful representations, such as particle distribution or
more abstract models such as energy flow diagrams or systems representations, and
learning to apply these flexibly. Understanding a concept in science involves being
able to operate flexibly and coherently with a range of associated representations, and
this process will involve both deductive and inductive logical modes, and non-formal
personal and perceptual associations, as noted by Reif and Larkin (1991).
In many senses these ideas are not new. Conceptual change strategies have long
advocated opportunities for students to engage with, explore and negotiate ideas,
and the need to go beyond definitional approaches to concepts is well established.
This representational focus offers the possibility of a more active and engaging
approach to teaching and learning, and pedagogical strategies that support students
to move towards more scientifically powerful ways of seeing the world. Conceptual
change approaches still struggle to theorize how to bridge the gap between students’
and scientists’ conceptions. We would suggest that our analysis, based on Klein
(2006), of recent cognitive science perspectives, particularly emphasizing the build-
ing of students’ representational resources, offer such a theoretical perspective and a
way forward for teaching and learning in science.
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